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Abstract
In this paper, we rst dene bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible inter-
ference (BNAI), derive its process-theoretic characterization and present a com-
positional verication method with respect to the main operators over communi-
cating processes, generalizing in this way the similar trace-based results obtained
in [19] into the ner notion of observation-based bisimulation [6]. Like its trace-
based version, BNAI admits information ow between secrecy levels only through a
downgrader (e.g. a cryptosystem), but is phrased into a generalization of observa-
tional equivalence [18]. We then describe an admissible interference-based method
for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, extending, in a non-trivial way, the non
interference-based approach presented in [11]. Condentiality and authentication
for cryptoprotocols are dened in terms of BNAI and their respective bisimulation-
based proof methods are derived. Finally, as a signicant illustration of the method,
we consider simple case studies: the paradigmatic examples of the Wide Mouthed
Frog protocol [1] and the Woo and Lam one-way authentication protocol [25]. The
original idea of this methodology is to prove that the intruder may interfere with
the protocol only through selected channels considered as admissible when leading
to harmless interference.
1 Introduction
One of the basic concerns in systems analysis is to ensure that programs do
not leak sensitive data to a third party, either maliciously or inadvertently.
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This key aspect of security concerns is often referred to as secrecy. Informa-
tion ow analysis addresses this concern by clarifying conditions when a ow
of information in a program is safe (i.e. high-level information never ows into
low-level channels). These conditions, called non interference properties [10],
capture any causal dependency between high-level actions and low-level be-
havior.
However, many practical secrecy problems go beyond the scope of non in-
terference. Cryptosystems, for example, permit encrypted private or classied
information to ow safely onto unprotected (i.e. low-level) channels despite
the obvious causal dependency between the secret data m and encryption key
K, on the one hand, and, the declassied data fmg
K
(m encrypted by K), on
the other. Indeed, any variation of m or K is reected in fmg
K
. In this case,
the main concern is to ensure that programs leak sensitive information only
through the cryptosystem or, more generally, through the downgrading sys-
tem. Admissible interference [19] is such a property. In this paper, we dene
bisimulation-based semantics for non-deterministic admissible interference. It
appears that observation-dependent bisimulation based on an observation cri-
terion O or O-bisimulation (called O-congruence in [6]) provides a suitable
theoretical framework for expressing bisimulation-based non-deterministic ad-
missible interference (BNAI). As we shall see, BNAI has an elegant process-
theoretic characterization (traditionally called the unwinding theorem in the
theory of information ow) and attractive compositionality properties.
Non interference-based methods have been designed to analyze crypto-
graphic protocols [12,9]. The basic idea of the method is to prove that no in-
truder can interfere with the protocol. In this paper, we rene this method by
considering as admissible the interference caused by encryption. This admis-
sible interference can be expressed by simply identifying downgrading actions
corresponding to encryption actions occurring in the protocol. This paper will
highlight two kinds of advantages of the admissible interference-based method
over a non interference-based one. In some cases, the method permits analysis
of the protocol's information ow without the necessity of extending the syn-
tax of the process algebra with encryption and decryption operators. In other
cases, it allows harmless interference, i.e. interference that does not corre-
spond to a successful attack, to be discarded at the specication level, rather
than screening it manually from the by-products of the verication process.
The paper is organized as follows. A variant of the value-passing CCS,
extended with Boudol's observation criteria and its observation-dependent
bisimulation-based semantics, is introduced in section 2. Non-deterministic
admissible interference based on observation-dependent bisimulation is pre-
sented in section 3 with its algebraic process characterization and its compo-
sitionality properties with respect to the main process operators. In section 4,
we present dierent ways to use BNAI in the analysis of cryptoprotocols. More
particularly, we focus on condentiality and authentication properties. These
properties are dened in terms of BNAI and their respective bisimulation-
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based proof methods are derived. The method is further investigated through
the Wide Mounted Frog protocol in section 5 and the Woo and Lam one-
way authentication protocol in section 6. We conclude in section 7 with an
overview of related and future works.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Value-passing CCS
We need to start the discussion by identifying a computational syntax to struc-
ture the investigation around. Our work is based on value-passing CCS [18]
modied in various ways as we move along.
We consider the following message algebra, whose terms, ranged over by
a, are dened by:
a := v (value) j x (variable) j (a; a) (pair) j fag
a
(encryption):
We denote fv(a) the set of (free) variables appearing in a and we say that a is
a closed term when fv(a) = ;. Throughout this paper, any closed encryption
term fa
1
g
a
2
is viewed as the atomic value resulting from the encryption of the
closed term a
1
using the closed term a
2
as key. For any (atomic) value v and
x 2 fv(a), we write a[v=x] to denote the setting of every occurrence of x in a
to value v and a[v
1
=x
1
][v
2
=x
2
] is noted as a[v
1
=x
1
; v
2
=x
2
], and so on. Further,
we assume a set of at most denumerable channels, ranged over by c. Every
channel is typed, i.e. has a unique structure of terms (messages) that can be
sent and received over it. We write dom(c) to denote the domain of terms
that can be carried along c.
Actions of our extended value-passing CCS, ranged over by , are obtained
from combinations of one channel and one term, as follows:

c(a) or c(a) (output action),

c(a) (input action),

 (internal action).
for any a 2 dom(c). Thus, the set of Act = V is[ fg contains a set of visible
actions V is = In [ Out, where In is a set of input actions, Out = In is a
set of output actions and the function [:] : V is! V is is such that  = . We
dene the set of free variables of an action , denoted by fv(), as the set
fv(a) if  = c(a) or  = c(a), and fv() = ; if  =  . We say that an action
 is closed if fv() = ;, otherwise we say that it is open, and we use  to
range over the set of closed actions.
Agents (ranged over by P and Q) are constructed as follows:

0 (empty agent);

:P (prex );

P [v=x] (assignment);

P +Q (sum);
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
P jQ (parallel composition);

PnL (restriction);

[x
1
= x
2
] P (match);

P=O (O-observation);
where v is a value, x; x
1
; x
2
are variables, L is any set of actions and O is
a partial mapping from Act

to Act called observation criterion and whose
intended meaning will be claried in the next section. With this syntax,
recursion is dealt with by using agent names, e.g. by dening P = 
1
:P
0
and P
0
= 
2
:P for the 
1
:
2
loop. We dene fv(P ), the set of free variables
occurring in P , as the set of variables x appearing in P and not in the scope
of an input prex  such that x 2 fv(). When x 2 fv(P ), we often write
P (x) (with P (x
1
)(x
2
) = P (x
1
; x
2
), etc.) and P (v) instead of P [v=x] (where
every free occurrence of x in P is set to v). Otherwise, the variable x is said
to be bound . A closed agent , or simply a process, is an agent P such that
fv(P ) = ;. For the sake of simplicity, we often omit writing 0 by using the
notation \" instead of \:0".
We shall now dene a downgrading process as an extension of a process to
model systems and computations of computing entities interacting at dierent
trust levels in an environment controlled by a downgrading system. A down-
grading process is then a process whose set of visible actions V is is a partition
of three sets Lo, Hi and Dwn such that Lo = Lo, Hi = Hi and Dwn = Dwn.
2.2 Observation Criterion
In [6], Boudol has dened the notion of observation criterion to express an
observation of actions with the aim of considering the equivalence between
processes. Such a criterion on a set A of actions denes a set B of observables
or experiments. In this paper, only observation criteria of Act

are considered.
Denition 2.1 An observation criterion of Act

is a partial mapping O from
Act

to Act.
The intended meaning is that all sequences of actions in O
 1
() are held
to carry out the same observation . Thus, it is natural not to require the
mapping to be total: some sequences may be invisible or meaningless from a
given point of view. We are particularly interested in the observation criterion
O
Hi
dened by
O
 1
Hi
() =
8
<
:


 

if  2 V is


if  = 
and the observation criterion O
Lo
dened by
O
 1
Lo
() =
8
<
:
(fg [Hi)

 (fg [Hi)

if  2 Lo [Dwn
(fg [Hi)

if  = :
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Thus, two sequences are equivalent through the weak criterion O
Hi
if their vis-
ible content is the same and two sequences are equivalent through the criterion
O
Lo
if their visible low-level content is the same.
2.3 Semantics
The operational semantics of a process obtained from this language can also be
viewed as an extension of the usual notion of a non-deterministic nite-state
automaton where we allow an innite set of states and where we generally
do not consider nal states. Let c be a channel, let a 2 dom(c) be such that
fv(a) = fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g and let v; v
1
; : : : ; v
n
be values. Let also  be a closed
action,  a sequence of closed actions, L  V is and P; P
0
; Q and Q
0
agents.
The semantics of processes is dened as follows:
Prefix
 
:P

 !P
Input
 
c(a):P
c(a[v
1
=x
1
;:::;v
n
=x
n
])
 ! P [v
1
=x
1
;:::;v
n
=x
n
]
Sum
P

 !P
0
P+Q

 !P
0
and
Q

 !Q
0
P+Q

 !Q
0
Parallel
P

 !P
0
P jQ

 !P
0
jQ
and
Q

 !Q
0
P jQ

 !P jQ
0
Synchronization
P
c(a)
 !P
0
and Q
c(a)
 !Q
0
P jQ

 !P
0
jQ
0
Restriction
P

 !P
0
and 62L[L
PnL

 !P
0
nL
Match
P

 !P
0
[v=v] P

 !P
0
O   Observation
P

 !P
0
and O()=
P=O

 !P
0
=O
where notation P

 !P
0
stands for a computation of the sequence of closed
actions  = 
0

1
: : : 
n
2 Act

in the process P i.e. the nite string of transi-
tions satisfying P

0
 !P
1

1
 !  

n
 !P
0
. Given a process P and an observation
criterion O, we say that P=O is the O-observation of P . The notion of the
O-observation of a process is aimed at dening the process on an observable
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resulting from its observation through the observation criterion O.
Example 2.2 Consider the observation criterion O
Hi
and O
Lo
previously de-
ned. Put Hi = fg and Lo = f
1
; 
2
; 
3
g. Let P be a process having the
semantics illustrated in Fig. 1. Then the semantics of processes P=O
Hi
and
P=O
Lo
are given in Fig. 2. Note that, in both systems, we omitted looping 
transitions at every state.
P
a
a
?

1
a
a
a
a
? ?

2

3
 
 	

@
@R

Fig. 1. Semantics of process P .
P=O
HI
a
a
?

1

?

1
a
a
a
a
? ?

2

3
 
 	

@
@R

B
B
B
B
B
N

3
P=O
Lo
a
a
?

1

? ?

1

1
a
a
a
a
? ?

2

3
 
 	

@
@R








2
B
B
B
B
B
N

3
Fig. 2. Semantics of processes P=O
Hi
and P=O
Lo
.
We say that agent P
0
is reachable from P , also called a derivative, if there
is a computation P

 !P
0
for some  2 Act

. We shall frequently make use
the set R(P ) = fP
0
j 9
2Act

P

 !P
0
g as the set of reachable agents from P .
2.4 Observation-dependent Bisimulation
The concept of O-bisimulation
4
captures the notion of behavioral indistin-
guishability through O.
Denition 2.3 (i) Given processes P and Q and observation criterion O,
an O-simulation of P by Q is a relation R  R(P )R(Q) such that

(P;Q) 2 R,

If (P
1
; Q
1
) 2 R and P
1

 !P
2
, then there exists Q
2
2 R(Q) such that
(P
2
; Q
2
) 2 R and Q
1

 !Q
2
with O() = O().
In such a case, we denote P v
O
Q.
(ii) An O-simulation R of P by Q is an O-bisimulation if R
 1
is an O-
simulation of Q by P . We say that P and Q are O-bisimilar (denoted
P 
O
Q) in the case where they are related by an O-bisimulation.
4
Called O-congruence in [6]
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The best known examples of this are the criteria dening strong and weak
bisimulations of CCS. Both are special cases of criteria obtained from projec-
tions. Two sequences are equivalent through the weak criterion O
Hi
if their
visible content is the same. When O is the identity on Act, one gets the
strong criterion through which each sequence of actions is observable and dis-
tinguishable from any other sequence. In this way, weak bisimulation could
be seen as O
Hi
-bisimulation, and (strong) bisimulation could be seen as O
Act
-
bisimulation where O
Act
is the identity observation criterion, i.e. O
Act
() = 
for every  2 Act. We denote (strong) bisimulation between two processes P
and Q simply with P  Q and (strong) simulation of P by Q with P v Q.
More generally, the concept of O-bisimulation is related to bisimulation in the
following way.
Proposition 2.4 Given processes P and Q and observation criterion O, we
have
P 
O
Q if and only if P=O  Q=O:
It is important to note that Prop. 2.4 still holds when O-bisimulation and
bisimulation are both replaced with O-simulation and simulation.
3 Bisimulation-based Non-deterministic Admissible In-
terference
A drastic solution to avoid interference of high-level users on low-level users,
which is causing a very typical problem in computer security, is to forbid
these possible interferences. Several denitions of non interference have been
proposed in the literature (see [17] for a survey). In [10], a trace-based gener-
alization of non interference, called strong non-deterministic non interference
(SNNI), has been proposed. It is satised when that the low-level visible con-
tent of any system behavior, namely a visible trace, is still a system behavior.
Non-deterministic admissible interference (NAI) has been introduced in [19].
It is a trace-based property requiring SNNI everywhere but through dedi-
cated downgrading channels. The main result of this paper is the introduction
of bisimulation-based non-deterministic admissible interference (BNAI) that
exploits the concept of observation-dependent bisimulation presented in sec-
tion 2.4. This section also gives an algebraic characterization of BNAI through
an Unwinding Theorem (Theorem 3.3) and results on compositionality w.r.t.
the main constructors of CCS (Theorem 3.4).
3.1 Semantics
In order to gain a better understanding of BNAI, we introduce a bisimulation-
based non interference property that renes SNNI and has suitable compo-
sitional properties. The following formulation of non interference requires
that a process O
Hi
-simulates its O
Lo
-observation. Thus, roughly speaking,
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bisimulation-based strong non-deterministic non interference (BSNNI) states
that any low-level observable behavior has to be also a high-level process be-
havior, in order to disallow any correlation between a high-level behavior and
a low-level observation.
Denition 3.1 Process P satises BSNNI if
P=O
Lo
v
O
Hi
P:
It is not diÆcult to prove, using Prop. 2.4, that this property coincides
with bisimulation-based strong non-deterministic non interference as proposed
in [10].
Intransitive non interference refers to the information ow properties that
require that systems admit information ow from the high level to the low
level only through specic downgrading channels. To capture this property,
it was proposed in [13] that any agent P
0
derived from P and executing no
downgrading action be required to satisfy non interference. More precisely, for
P to satisfy intransitive non interference P
0
nDwnmust satisfy non interference
for every P
0
2 R(P ). Rephrasing it in the context of BSNNI as the non
interference property yields the denition of BNAI.
Denition 3.2 Process P satises bisimulation-based non-deterministic ad-
missible interference (BNAI) if
8
P
0
2R(P )
(P
0
nDwn)=O
Lo
v
O
Hi
(P
0
nDwn):
The next theorem presents an algebraic characterization of BNAI based
on O
Lo
-bisimulation.
Theorem 3.3 (Unwinding Theorem for BNAI) The process P satises
BNAI if and only if
8
P
0
2R(P )
P
0
nDwn 
O
Lo
P
0
n (Dwn [ Hi):
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is presented in Appendix A.1.
3.2 A Compositional Proof Method
The next theorem establishes the compositionality of BNAI over closed agents
with respect to the restriction operator and a weak form of compositionality
of BNAI with respect to the concurrent operator.
Theorem 3.4 (Compositionality Theorem for BNAI) Let L  Act.
(i) If process P satises BNAI, then P n L satises BNAI.
(ii) If processes P and Q may not synchronize on downgrading actions and
both satisfy BNAI, then P jQ satises BNAI.
The proof of Theorem 3.4 is given in Appendix A.2. This result extends
a similar result for NAI obtained in [19]. A direct proof that a process sat-
ises BNAI is, according to Theorem 3.3, to exhibit for each derivative P
0
,
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a O
Lo
-bisimulation starting from P
0
. When the transition system obtained
from the semantics is nite, this can be done automatically. Many tools, in-
cluding the Edinburgh Concurrency Workbench (CWB) [7], exploits eÆcient
algorithms for checking bisimilarity between nite processes, as developed
in [15]. We are currently designing and implementing at the

Ecole Polytech-
nique de Montreal , in collaboration with the Universite d'Orleans, a tool to
check whether a nite state downgrading process satises BNAI or not (avail-
able at www.crac.polymtl.ca). We plan to extend this tool to cope with
innite-state processes such as those dened by totally normed Basic Process
Algebra (BPA) [14] or Pushdown Processes [23].
4 Using BNAI to analyze cryptographic protocols
In this section, we give non trivial illustrations of how BNAI can be used
to detect aws in security protocols. The main contribution of this section
is a general information ow method using BNAI that renes Focardi and
Gorrieri's methods for analyzing cryptoprotocols [9,11] where the authors have
either to extend the syntax and semantics of CCS before proceeding with
analysis or to lter out manually meaningless interference (from authentication
point of view) resulting from the analysis. Improvements given by BNAI
depend on the type of security property under study:

in the case of condentiality properties (see section 5), downgrading actions
may be interpreted to counter the unavoidable but harmless interference
caused by encryption, and thus the process algebra does not have to be
extended with encryption and decryption primitives;

in most of the other cases, particularly for the authentication properties
(see section 6), downgrading actions may be used to detect actions causing
interference, but not corresponding to successful attacks, before analysis,
rather than after analysis.
As we shall see, BNAI provides a natural interpretation of the following
condentiality property for security protocols:
No enemy process interacting with the protocol can discriminate, in an
inadmissible way, the protocol's behavior and the behavior of the protocol
exchanging no condential information.
A second property for security protocols on authenticity can be interpreted in
terms of BNAI as follows:
No enemy process can interfere in an inadmissible way with the protocol.
We now undertake the task of formalizing those properties in the context of
our process algebra. Given such a formalization, we are also interested to
derive corresponding Unwinding Theorems to verify such properties.
In the sequel, we use the variable X to range over process names and
variables (including tuples) w; x; y; z; : : : to range over value terms. A crypto-
9
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protocol P involving principals A
1
; A
2
; : : : A
n
(specied as processes in value-
passing CCS) is viewed as the following:
P (x
1
; x
2
; : : : x
n
) = ( A
1
(x
1
) j A
2
(x
2
) j : : : j A
n
(x
n
) ) n C(1)
where C corresponds to the set of public actions used in P . The restriction
over the set C can be viewed as a forced synchronization of actions made on
public channels. Every condential data exchanged on a public channel must
be properly encrypted since we assume that such channels are insecure. We
shall also make the hypothesis that any other action, i.e. not belonging to C,
is executed on a secure channel.
An attack on P executed by an enemy process E is specied as the process:
P
E
(x
1
; x
2
; : : : x
n
; x
E
) = ( A
1
(x
1
) j A
2
(x
2
) j : : : j A
n
(x
n
) j E(x
E
) ) n C:(2)
Eq. 2 clearly expresses the fact that attackers may intercept any message
(closed term) sent out on a public channel.
In such a specication, each principal X has its own set of private actions,
noted Hi(X), and we use notation Hi(X
1
; X
2
) to denote the set Hi(X
1
) [
Hi(X
2
), and so on. Hence, we have Hi =
S
X
Hi(X) and Lo = C. It is
important to note that the content of the disjoint sets Hi, Lo and Dwn is, as
we shall see, case dependent. In general, we shall use the notation c
X
to denote
a private channel belonging to a principalX and simply c for a public channel.
For any principal X, we consider the following natural observation criterion
O
X
describing the actions observable by X which is dened as follows:
O
 1
X
() =
8
<
:
(Hi
c
(X) [ fg)

 (Hi
c
(X) [ fg)

if  2 Hi(X) [ Dwn [ Lo
(Hi
c
(X) [ fg)

if  = 
where Hi
c
(X) = HinHi(X). For any two principals X
1
and X
2
, we may also
consider the joint observation criterion O
X
1
;X
2
dened as one might expect.
Depending on the type of security property we wish to enforce, each set
Hi(X) may contain encryption actions and decryption actions. Encryption is
viewed as the sequence of actions e
X
(x; y):cipher
X
(fyg
x
) where output action
e
X
(x; y) signies the encryption of term y using key x (e.g. by sending y
and x to X's local encrypter), and input action cipher
X
(z) then creates a
(bound) variable z corresponding to the resulting value (often referred to as
the term fyg
x
). Similarly, decryption is viewed as the sequence of actions
d
X
(x; fyg
x
)):read
X
(y) where output action d
X
(x; z) signies the decryption
of the term z using the key x (e.g. by sending z and x to X's local decrypter),
and input action read
X
(y) waits for the resulting term y.
4.1 Preservation of Condentiality
The major concern of cryptoprotocols is keeping the condentiality of classi-
ed information that needs to be sent over private channels. Attacks on such
protocols take dierent forms, from direct attempts to steal an entire con-
10
Lafrance and Mullins
dential message to much more subtle attempts to detect exchanges of private
data. In this paper, a condentiality property is introduced which is very
sensitive to any kind of inadmissible information ow leading to unwanted
secrecy leaks.
This highlights the fact that the principal X can only see actions coming
from either a public channel, i.e. from Lo, or its own set Hi(X) of private
actions. In the case of condentiality properties, we are particularly inter-
ested in the observation criterion O
X
when X is an enemy process interacting
with the protocol. For the following condentiality property, the set Dwn
of downgrading actions corresponds to actions causing admissible declassi-
cation of information such as proposed by admissible interference. This type
of action is mainly used to indicate the execution of an encryption action as
cipher
X
(fyg
x
).
Given any value m, let Act(m) be the set of actions containing m non-
encrypted in its term (e.g. read
X
(m) or e
X
(k;m), but not cipher
X
(fmg
k
)),
and let O
m
be the observation criterion dened by
O
 1
m
() =
8
<
:
(Act
c
(m)[fg)

 (Act
c
(m)[fg)

if  2 Act(m) [ Hi(E) [ Dwn [ Lo
(Act
c
(m)[fg)

if  = 
where Act
c
(m) = Hi n (Act(m) [ Hi(E)).
Denition 4.1 (Preservation of Condentiality) The protocol P (m)
preserves the condentiality of message m if, for every enemy process E,
8
P
0
E
2R(P
E
)
(P
0
E
(m) nDwn)=O
E
v
O
m
P
0
E
(m) nDwn:
This property may be viewed as
8
E: enemy process
P
E
(m) satises BNAI:
However, we must note that preservation of condentiality oers an altered
interpretation of BNAI once an enemy process E is xed, since not every
action from HinHi(E) is considered a high-level action, only those containing
condential information. This property of preservation of condentiality is
illustrated is section 5 using the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [1].
Remark 4.2 We note the trivial fact that if P
E
has a derivative P
0
E
that
may perform an action from Hi(E) \ Act(m), which clearly corresponds to a
successful attack since process E can see m, then protocol P does not preserve
the condentiality of message m since such a transition belonging to (P
0
E
(m)n
Dwn)=O
E
may not be O
m
-simulated by process P
0
E
(m) n (Dwn [ Act(m)).
We can establish the following unwinding theorem for our condentiality
property inspired by the unwinding theorem for BNAI (Theorem 3.3).
Theorem 4.3 Protocol P (m) preserves the condentiality of message m if
and only if for every enemy process E,
8
P
0
E
2R(P
E
)
P
0
E
(m) nDwn 
O
E
P
0
E
(m) n (Dwn [ Act(m)):
11
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The Proof of Theorem 4.3 is given in Appendix A.3.
Example 4.4 Consider the following simple protocol where two principals A
and B sharing secret key k
AB
want to exchange a secret binary message m:
A(k
AB
; m) = e
A
(k
AB
; m):cipher
A
(fmg
k
AB
):c
1
(fmg
k
AB
)
B(k
AB
) = c
1
(x):d
B
(k
AB
; x):read
B
(y):
( [
1
(y) = 0] c
2
(0) + [
1
(y) = 1] c
2
(1) )
where c
1
and c
2
are public channels, cipher
A
2 Dwn is a downgrading channel
allowing the declassication of fmg
k
AB
, and 
1
is the last-bit projection (e.g.

1
(10010) = 0).
This particular example has an obvious inadmissible condentiality break
since it leaks pieces of information about m's content (in this case its parity)
without revealingm entirely. Such an attack on condentiality may be pursued
by the following enemy process:
E = c
2
(z):( [z = 0]
even
E
+ [z = 1]
odd
E
)
which can evaluate the parity of the exchanged secret message m.
Using theorem 4.3, we see that this particular protocol fails to preserve
the condentiality of m. Let A
0
(k
AB
; m) = c
1
(fmg
k
AB
) 2 R(A(k
AB
; m)) and
P
0
E
= ( A
0
(k
AB
; m) j B(k
AB
) j E ) n fc
1
; c
2
g 2 R(P
E
). Then we have
P
0
E
(m) nDwn 6
O
E
P
0
E
(m) n (Dwn [ Act(m))
since
( P
0
E
(m)nDwn )=O
E
 :::( [ 
1
(m) = 0 ] :even
E
+ [ 
1
(y) = 1 ] :odd
E
);
while ( P
0
E
(m) n (Dwn [ Act(m)) )=O
E
 : .
4.2 Preservation of Authenticity
An authentication protocol is a security protocol where a principal A wants
to authenticate a second principal B and/or authenticate himself for B. Suc-
cessful attacks on such protocols generally take the form of an enemy process
convincing B that he is A. In many cases, A initiated the protocol with that
enemy process which uses information obtained from A to execute his mas-
querade toward B, but an enemy process may also use information intercepted
from public channels, as in section 5.
In order to work with authentication protocols, we adapt our notation
established in Eq. 1 and Eq. 2. Thus, an authentication protocol where agent
A initiates the authentication procedure with agent B is viewed as
P
A!B
(x
A
; x
B
; x
1
; : : : x
n
) = ( A(x
A
) j B(x
B
) jA
1
(x
1
) j : : : j A
n
(x
n
) ) n C(3)
where the A
i
are other processes contributing to the protocol. Also, given an
enemy process E, the participation of E in the authentication protocol P , as
in Eq. 2, is denoted either by P
E(A)!B
when E tries to impersonate A in the
12
Lafrance and Mullins
eyes of B (for protocols where the instigator wants to authenticate himself),
or by P
A!E(B)
when E tries to impersonate B in the eyes of A (for protocols
where the instigator wants to authenticate B). For the sake of simplicity, this
paper considers only one-way authentication protocols where the instigator
wants to authenticate himself, thus we shall only consider P
E(A)!B
attacks.
The other cases, including two-ways authentication protocols, are similar.
For authentication properties, the downgrading actions do not play the
same role as in Def. 4.1, the situation being reversed. In Def. 4.5, the set Dwn
corresponds rather to a set of admissible attacks from enemy processes. In
other words, by viewing any attack attempt on the protocol as interference, we
allow enemy processes to cause harmless interference through specic channels.
This situation is illustrated in section 6 through the Woo and Lam one-way
authentication protocol [25].
Denition 4.5 (Preservation of Authenticity) Protocol P
A!B
preserves
the authenticity of A if, for every enemy process E,
8
Q2R(P
E(A)!B
)
(Q nDwn)=O
B
v
O
B;E
Q nDwn:
Once again, this authenticity property may be viewed as follows:
8
E: enemy process
P
E(A)!B
satises BNAI
but this time the interpretation of BNAI, given an enemy process E, is such
that the high-level actions come from Hi(E) and the low-level actions come
from Hi(B) and Lo. As in Def. 4.1, some actions, in fact those from Hi(A)
and Hi(S), are not taken into account.
The following unwinding theorem for preservation of authenticity is ob-
tained by applying Theorem 3.3. We omit the proof, which is similar to that
of Theorem 4.3.
Theorem 4.6 Protocol P
A!B
preserves the authenticity of A if and only if,
for every enemy process E,
8
Q2R(P
E(A)!B
)
Q nDwn 
O
B
Q n (Dwn [ Hi(E)):
5 The Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol
In [12], the authors proposed a method to detect this attack using a non
deductibility property and an extension of the Security Process Algebra (which
is similar to value-passing CCS) called Crytographic Security Process Algebra.
This extended process algebra introduces encryption and decryption operators
in its syntax and deduction rules in its semantics. Our approach, based on
Def. 4.1, tends to show that information ow methods can be used without
having to extend the process algebra semantics to deal with encryption and
decryption, this extension being actually encapsulated in a clever choice of
downgrading channels. We back up this assertion with a simplied version of
the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol [1] on which a successful attack was revealed
in [2].
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The Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol is used in order to establish a secure
channel between two principals A and B on which A wants to send a con-
dential message m
A
encrypted with a session key k
AB
. The protocol assumes
that A and B share keys k
AS
and k
BS
respectively with a trusted third party
S (e.g. a server). The protocol consists of the following three messages:
Message 1: A
A;B;fk
AB
g
k
AS
 ! S
Message 2: S
fA;k
AB
g
k
BS
 ! B
Message 3: A
fm
A
g
k
AB
 ! B:
First, process A sends to S his identier (A), his counterpart identier (B)
and a fresh key k
AB
encrypted with a permanent key k
AS
shared with S that
we note fk
AB
g
k
AS
. Second, S decrypts fk
AB
g
k
AS
and sends A's identier and
the fresh key k
AB
to process B encrypted using the shared key k
BS
. Finally,
A sends message m
A
to B encrypted with the key k
AB
. Process B can now
decrypt fA; k
AB
g
k
BS
to obtain k
AB
, and then fm
A
g
k
AB
.
A well known attack on this protocol (reported in [2]) may be pursued
by an enemy process E as follows: rst, E intercepts Message 1 , swaps B's
identier with his own and sends it to S. Principal S now believes that A
wants to give the session key k
AB
to E, thus sends fA; k
AB
g
k
ES
to E who can
decrypt it to get k
AB
. Process E may now intercept and decrypt Message 3
to read the condential message m
A
. This attack will be specied in more
details in section 5.2. Before, we need to specify principals A, B and S.
5.1 Protocol Specication
Processes A, B and S are specied using value-passing CCS as follows:
A(m; k) = e
A
(k
AS
; k):cipher
A
(fkg
k
AS
):c
1
(A;B; fkg
k
AS
):
e
A
(k;m):cipher
A
(fmg
k
):c
3
(fmg
k
)
B = c
2
(z):( d
B
(k
BS
; z):read
B
((X; u)):c
3
(w) +
c
3
(w):d
B
(k
BS
; z):read
B
((X; u)) ):d
B
(u; w):read
B
(v)
S = c
1
(X
1
; X
2
; x):d
S
(k
X
1
S
; x):read
S
(y):
e
S
(k
X
2
S
; (X
1
; y)):cipher
S
(f(X
1
; y)g
k
X
2
S
):c
2
(f(X
1
; y)g
k
X
2
S
):S
where c
1
, c
2
and c
3
are public channels on which messages 1, 2 and 3 are
respectively exchanged. We write C = fc
1
; c
2
; c
3
g. In this particular exam-
ple, we have Hi(X) = fe
X
; d
X
; read
X
g. Thus, following the denition of a
downgrading process, we have Hi =
S
X
Hi(X), Lo = C = fc
1
; c
2
; c
3
g and
Dwn =
S
X
fcipher
X
g. The Wide Mouthed Frog protocol is viewed as follows:
P (m
A
) = ( A(m
A
; k
AB
) j B j S ) n C:
14
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5.2 Enemy process
An alternative to using the universal quantier \for every enemy process E"
from our two properties (Def. 4.1 and Def. 4.5) is to dene a \strongest"
enemy. This alternative is discussed at the end of this paper, but is irrelevant
to this particular example since we set up to prove that the protocol does
not preserve the condentiality of message m
A
. To complete such a task, we
only have to produce one enemy process for which Def. 4.1 does not hold. For
that purpose, we specify in value-passing CCS the enemy process used in [12]
which corresponds to the attack mentioned above:
E = c
1
(X
1
; X
2
; x):c
1
(X
1
; E; x):c
2
(z):( d
E
(k
ES
; z):read((X; u)):c
3
(w) +
c
3
(w):d
E
(k
BS
; z):read((X; u)) ):d
E
(u; w):read(v)
From Remark 4.2 and this enemy process, we can conclude that the Wide
Mouthed Frog protocol P (m
A
) does not preserve the condentiality of message
m
A
.
6 The Woo and Lam Protocol
To illustrate the authentication property from Def. 4.5, we use the Woo and
Lam one-way authentication protocol [25]. This particular application illus-
trates the way that admissible interference permits identication, at the spec-
ication level, of possible interferences caused by enemy processes that do
not correspond to successful attacks. Such admissible interference, referred to
above as admissible attack, has been detected using information ow-based
analysis in [8].
This protocol is initiated by a principal A who wants to identify himself
with authentication to another principal B where we only assume that both
A and B share a permanent encryption/decryption key (noted k
AS
and k
BS
)
with a trusted third party S (e.g. a server). The protocol is summarized in
the following steps:
Message 1: A
A
 ! B
Message 2: B
n
B
 ! A
Message 3: A
fn
B
g
k
AS
 ! B
Message 4: B
fA;fn
B
g
k
AS
g
k
BS
 ! S
Message 5: S
fn
B
g
k
BS
 ! B:
First, A initiates the protocol by sending his identier to B, and B responds
by sending a fresh nonce n
B
to A. The latter then sends back n
B
encrypted
with key k
AS
. Principal B can now proceed to authenticate A with the help
of S by sending A's identier and the last message received from A, both
encrypted with key k
BS
. The trusted third party S decrypts this message
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from B using k
BS
, then decrypts fn
B
g
k
AS
using k
AS
and, nally sends n
B
back to B encrypted with k
BS
. Once this last message has been decrypted, B
only has to verify whether or not the resulting value corresponds to its initial
nonce n
B
to approve A's authentication.
In section 6.2, we are interested in the attack on this protocol that was
reported in [26]. In this particular attack, principal A initiates the protocol
with enemy process E which forwards all information received from A to
another principal B in order for E to impersonate A.
6.1 Protocol Specication
In order to specify Woo and Lam's protocol using value-passing CCS, we dene
principals A (instigator), B (respondent) and S (server) as follows:
A(X
B
) = init
A
(X
B
):c
1X
B
(A):c
2A
(x):e
A
(k
AS
; x):cipher
A
(fxg
k
AS
):
commit
A
(X
B
; x):c
3X
B
(fxg
k
AS
)
B(n) = c
1B
(X
A
):request
B
(X
A
):c
2X
A
(n):c
3B
(y):e
B
(k
BS
; (X
A
; y)):
cipher
B
(f(X
A
; y)g
k
BS
):c
4
(f(X
A
; y)g
k
BS
):c
5B
(w):d
B
(k
BS
; w):
read
B
(u):[u = n] auth
B
(X
A
)
S(X
B
) = c
4
(z
1
):d
S
(k
X
B
S
; z
1
):read
S
((X
A
; z
2
)):d
S
(k
X
A
S
; z
2
):read
S
(z
3
):
e
S
(k
X
B
S
; z
3
):cipher
S
(fz
3
g
k
X
B
S
):c
5X
B
(fz
3
g
k
X
B
S
)
where we use notation established above for encryption channels and decryp-
tion channels. We use c
iX
to denote the public channel used to send the ith
message intended for X. We also added the following private channels:

init
X
(X
0
): to indicate that X wants to initiate the protocol with X
0
;

request
X
(X
0
): to indicate that X (believes he) just received a request to
execute the protocol form X
0
;

commit
X
(X
0
; x): to indicate that X is committed to identify himself to X
0
with authentication using nonce x;

auth
X
(X
0
): to indicate that X (believes he) has authenticated X
0
.
The Woo and Lam protocol can be viewed as follows:
P
A!B
= ( A(B) j B(n
B
) j S(B) ) n C
where C =
S
X
fc
1X
; c
2X
; c
3X
; c
4
; c
5X
g and we put Hi(X) =
S
X
0
fe
X
; cipher
X
;
d
X
; read
X
; init
X
(X
0
); request
X
(X
0
); commit
X
(X
0
; x); auth
X
(X
0
)g and Lo =
C. Note that we have not considered downgrading actions yet, since such
actions are interpreted as admissible interference caused by an enemy process
and hence they only appear in such processes, as we shall see next.
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6.2 Enemy Process
As in the previous section, we have postponed the task of constructing a
\greatest enemy process" in future works and concentrate on the aw revealed
by Abadi in the Woo and Lam protocol [26] using BNAI. More precisely, we
see that the Woo and Lam one-way authentication protocol specied as P
A!B
does not preserve the authenticity of A.
To achieve this, we consider the following enemy process executing the
attack reported in [26] and [8]:
E(X
B
) = c
1E
(X
A
):request
E
(X
A
):dwn
E
:init
E
(X
B
):dwn
E
:c
1X
B
(X
A
):
c
2X
A
(x):c
2X
A
(x):c
3E
(y):commit
E
(X
B
):c
3X
B
(y)
where we consider any action of type request
E
(X) or init
E
(X) as admissible
interference from E, putting Dwn = fdwn
E
g.
Thus, the attack on the Woo and Lam protocol is expressed as follows:
P
E(A)!B
= ( A(E) j B(n
B
) j S(B) j E(B) ) n C
where principal A tries to authenticate himself toward E, but the latter uses
data received from A to steal his identity and successfully authenticate himself
as A toward B. In the end, B believes that E is A.
Using Theorem 4.6, we can see that P
A!B
does not preserve the authen-
ticity of A since
Q nDwn 6
O
B
Q n (Dwn [ Hi(E))
for some Q 2 R(P
E(A)!B
). Such Q is given by any derivative that can execute
a computation of request
B
(A):commit
A
(E):commit
E
(B):auth
B
(A). This se-
quence of actions becomes request
B
(A):::auth
B
(A) in (Q nDwn)=O
B
, but
the same sequence becomes request
B
(A): in (Qn(Dwn [ Hi(E))=O
B
. Thus,
we may say that (Q nDwn)=O
B
6 (Q n (Dwn [ Hi(E)))=O
B
which leads
us to our conclusion.
Note that a similar approach using non interference was proposed in [8].
The authors have to lter interference, after their analysis, that does not
correspond to attacks such as the trace
init
A
(E):request
E
(A):init
E
(B):request
B
(A):commit
A
(E):
Admissible interference allows specication of these harmless attacks and only
failures caused by successful attacks, to be obtained from any analysis of the
protocol. Also, by identifying such admissible interference before initiating an
automatic analysis of a security protocol, results are gained with precision and
clarity. A cost savings on the software design process might also be expected.
7 Final Remarks and Related Works
The main contributions of this paper are a bisimulation-based generalization
of trace-based admissible interference initially proposed in [19], its correspond-
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ing unwinding theorem (Theorem 3.3) and a compositionality theorem (The-
orem 3.4) w.r.t. the main constructors of concurrent processes. Moreover, as
a non-trivial application of BNAI, it is proposed in Section 4 a new approach
to analyze cryptoprotocols. This approach extends the approach based on
non interference presented in [8,11,12,9]. Condentiality and authentication
are dened in terms of BNAI and their respective bisimulation-based proof
method (Theorems 4.3 and 4.6 respectively) are derived. Its main advantage
over a non interference-based approach is to reveal aws with more eÆciency
by discarding harmless attacks earlier in the protocol's design process and
to permit the use of a general purpose process algebra, instead of special-
ized process algebra extended with with encryption-decryption primitives to
cope with admissible interference caused by the cryptosystem. This method
has been illustrated in detail in two case studies: the Wide Mouthed Frog
protocol (Section 5) and the Woo and Lam one-way authentication protocol
(Section 6).
In addition to the papers mentioned above, the process algebraic approach
to cryptographic protocols has also been followed in [21,16,22] that consider
model-checking of security protocols in a CSP-based framework. This ap-
proach requires explicitly designing a specic (powerful enough) intruder. Of
course, there is always a certain amount of arbitrarity in determining this in-
truder and any modication of the intruder would require a new analysis. In
our paper, a more radical approach is taken: the intruder may be any process
that can be dened in CCS. We postpone the discussion about this crucial
issue to the end of this section, and mention some promising research threads.
We are investigating more general properties of intransitive non interfer-
ence for processes, inspired by Pinsky's study [20]. It appears indeed that
the algorithm presented by Pinsky to construct a minimal equivalence and its
associated unwinding condition for a downgrading policy, can be thought of
as an algorithm to construct the appropriate bisimulation.
Motivated by the ability of the -calculus, its variants and extensions to
model mobility more accurately and hence, secure distributed applications
over the Internet, we believe that admissible interference and more generally
intransitive non interference should be characterized in terms of such calculi.
A further step will be then to extend our compositional and complete (at
least for nite-state processes) information ow method to the analysis of
cryptographic protocols for such calculi.
In the last few years, many approaches based on the -calculus, have been
proposed to analyze security protocols. Below we would like to highlight
three among those we intend to focus our attention on, in view of further de-
velopments: the Abadi-Gordon's Spi-calculus [3] and its sound but incomplete
framed bisimulation-based proof method [2], the Boreale et al.'s variant of the
Spi-calculus [5] with its sound and complete barbed bisimulation-based proof
method and the control ow analysis for the -calculus presented in [4].
Although they are not based on information ow approach to secrecy, the
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Spi-calculus approaches are inspiring for further developments of our method,
particularly in the way that the problem of the \most powerful intruder"
briey mentioned above, is overcome. In this paragraph, we discuss this ma-
jor issue. A security property should be satised even in presence of a hostile
environment. Also, it should be resistant to every potential attacker and,
checking this condition is generally intractable. The Spi-calculus overcomes
this problem by representing security properties as weakened form of testing
equivalence. Let P (M) be a process P processing a piece of data m. From
the Spi-calculus point of view, P preserves secrecy of m if there is no test
with the capability to discriminate P (m) from P (m
0
), for every m
0
. A test
nicely formalizes the idea of a generic experiment or observation that another
Spi-process (a potential attacker) might perform on P . So P and Q are testing
equivalent if there exists no attacker powerful enough to discriminate them.
Also, Abadi-Gordon's denition [3] suers from quantication over all possible
contexts. In [5], it is designed as an enriched labeled transition system, used
to dene a weak bisimulation equivalence, that avoids quantication over con-
texts and leads to a complete proof method. Further research is required for
a fuller understanding of these notions and for tailoring up information ow
techniques to reason over them. But we apprehend already that introduc-
ing encryption-decryption primitives in the -calculus leads to a bisimulation
method that has to deal with additional semantic rules. Moreover, we conjec-
ture that these rules can be captured by a right interpretation of downgrading
and an adequate observation criterion of this enriched labeled transition sys-
tem in order to admit any interference caused by the inevitable correlation
between a ciphertext and its related text. More recently, an information ow
approach based on the -calculus has been proposed with application to the
control ow analysis of cryptoprotocols in [4]. We conjecture that the simple
security properties established by the authors, namely the no leaks and the no
read-up/no write-down properties, do not allow to analyze subliminal channels
in authentication protocols, contrarily to information ow properties like non
interference and admissible interference.
Finally, from a completely dierent point of view, we are trying to ex-
ploit the well-known result establishing decidability of bisimulation over some
classes of innite-state processes, e.g. totally normed Basic Process Algebra
(BPA) [14], and hence, over pushdown automata [24]. It is indeed an attrac-
tive avenue to address the \most powerful intruder" as the process using a
queue or a stack as an innite memory and having access to any public chan-
nels, its own private channels allowing him to encrypt and decrypt and any
other initial data such as shared encryption keys, nonces and so on.
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A Theorem's proof
A.1 Proof of the Unwinding Theorem for BNAI
Proof of Theorem 3.3 Given Q = P
0
nDwn for P
0
2 R(P ), it is suÆcient
to prove that
Q v
O
Lo
Q nHi(A.1)
since any O
Lo
-simulation of Q by Q nHi is actually a O
Lo
-bisimulation.
By denition ofO
Hi
-simulation and since (Q=O
Lo
)=O
Hi
 Q=O
Lo
, we have
Q=O
Lo
v
O
Hi
Q() Q=O
Lo
v Q=O
Hi
(A.2)
by Prop. 2.4, and it is not diÆcult to see that
Q=O
Lo
v Q=O
Hi
() Q=O
Lo
v (Q=O
Hi
) nHi:(A.3)
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Indeed, given a (Q=O
Lo
)-transition Q
1

 !Q
2
(hence with Q
1
2 R(Q) and  2
ActnHi), Q
1

 !Q
2
is a Q=O
Hi
-transition if and only if it is a ((Q=O
Hi
)nHi)-
transition. Moreover, we have
(Q=O
Hi
) nHi (Q nHi)=O
Hi
(A.4)
 (Q nHi)=O
Lo
(A.5)
Hence, putting Eqs. A.2- A.5 together, we obtain:
Q=O
Lo
v (Q nHi)=O
Lo
(A.6)
and, by Prop. 2.4, Eq. A.6 is equivalent to Eq. A.1. 2
A.2 Proof of the Compositionality Theorem for BNAI
The next proposition, proved in [18], shows that strong bisimulation is a con-
gruence with respect to the concurrent and restriction operators, and that
there is a weak form of distributivity of the restriction operator over the con-
current one.
Proposition A.1 If P
1
 Q
1
and P
2
 Q
2
, then
(i) P
1
jP
2
 Q
1
jQ
2
(ii) P
1
n L  Q
1
n L
(iii) If P
1
and P
2
may not synchronize on actions in L, then
(P
1
jP
2
) n L  (Q
1
n L)j(Q
2
n L):
The proof of Theorem 3.4 requires the following lemma stating that the
functional composition of the restriction to Dwn and of a quotient with O
Hi
is distributive over the concurrent composition.
Lemma A.2 If processes P and Q may not synchronize on downgrading ac-
tions, then
((P jQ) nDwn)=O
Lo
 ((P nDwn)=O
Lo
)j((Q nDwn)=O
Lo
)
Proof. It is suÆcient to show that
((P jQ) nDwn)=O
Lo
v ((P nDwn)=O
Lo
)j((Q nDwn)=O
Lo
)
because any simulation of ((P jQ) n Dwn)=O
Lo
by ((P n Dwn)=O
Lo
)j((Q n
Dwn)=O
Lo
) is actually a bisimulation. This results trivially from Prop. A.1.
For the v simulation, we proceed by structural induction on the concur-
rent composition rules. The only diÆcult case is the one raised from a 
transition by high-level action synchronization resulting from application of
the Synchronization rule. Let P
1
2 R(P ) and Q
1
2 R(Q) be such that
P
1
jQ
1

 !P
2
jQ
2
, a P jQ-transition issued from the P -transition P
1

 !P
2
and
the Q-transitionQ
1

 !Q
2
with  2 Hi. This results in the ((P nDwn)=O
Lo
))-
transition P
1

 !P
2
and the ((Q nDwn)=O
Lo
))-transition Q
1

 !Q
2
to obtain
the (((P nDwn)=O
Lo
))j((Q nDwn)=O
Lo
)))-transition P
1
jQ
1

 !P
2
jQ
2
. 2
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Proof of Theorem 3.4
(i) Given P
0
2 R(P ) and Q = P
0
n Dwn, then in view of Theorem 3.3, it
suÆces to prove:
Q 
O
Lo
Q nHi =) Q n L 
O
Lo
Q n (Hi [ L)
We have:
Q 
O
Lo
Q nHi()Q=O
Lo
 (Q nHi)=O
Lo
by Prop. 2.4
=) (Q=O
Lo
) n L  ((Q nHi)=O
Lo
) n L
by Prop. A.1
=) (Q n L)=O
Lo
 (Q n (Hi [ L))=O
Lo
()Q n L 
O
Lo
Q n (Hi [ L)
by Prop. 2.4:
(ii) Let P
0
jQ
0
2 R(P jQ). It is suÆcient to show that
(P
0
jQ
0
) nDwn v
O
Lo
((P
0
jQ
0
) n (Hi [ Dwn))(A.7)
in view of Theorem 3.3 and the fact that any O
Lo
-simulation of
(P
0
jQ
0
)nDwn by ((P
0
jQ
0
)n (Hi [ Dwn)) is actually a O
Lo
-bisimulation.
By Prop. 2.4, Eq A.7 is equivalent to:
((P
0
jQ
0
) nDwn)=O
Lo
v ((P
0
jQ
0
) n (Hi [ Dwn))=O
Lo
:
We have:
((P
0
jQ
0
) nDwn)=O
Lo
 ((P
0
nDwn)=O
Lo
)j((Q
0
nDwn)=O
Lo
)
by Lemma A.2
 ((P
0
n (Dwn [ Hi))=O
Lo
)j((Q
0
n (Dwn [ Hi))=O
Lo
)
by Prop. A.1 and Theorem 3.3
 ((P
0
n (Dwn [ Hi))j(Q
0
n (Dwn [ Hi)))=O
Lo
by Lemma A.2
v ((P
0
jQ
0
) n (Dwn [ Hi))=O
Lo
:
2
A.3 Preservation of Condentiality
Proof of Theorem 4.3 Since both statements use the same domain for
enemy processes, then, given an enemy process E and a derivative P
0
E
2
R(P
E
), we only have to show that
(P
0
E
(m) nDwn)=O
E
v
O
m
P
0
E
(m) nDwn
if and only if
P
0
E
(m) nDwn 
O
E
P
0
E
(m) n (Dwn [ Act(m)):
Let E be an enemy process, P
0
E
2 R(P
E
) a derivative and Q = P
0
E
(m) nDwn.
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As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, we see that
Q=O
E
v
O
m
Q () Q=O
E
v Q=O
m
() Q=O
E
v (Q=O
m
) n Act(m)
() Q=O
E
v (Q n Act(m))=O
E
() Q v
O
E
Q n Act(m)
() Q 
O
E
Q n Act(m):
2
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